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KNOWING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CREATION
Henk G. Geertsema
How should belief in creation affect our theoretical understanding of knowl­
edge? In this essay I argue that traditional views of knowledge, illustrated 
by Plato and Descartes, cannot do justice to the integral meaning of reality 
as God's creation. Making use of two metaphors, the visual metaphor for 
theoretical knowledge and the biblical one of hearing the divine promise- 
command to be, I sketch the outlines of a theoretical framework that takes 
belief in creation as its starting point. My approach is based upon insights of 
Reformational philosophy and leads to a view in which beliefs and proposi­
tions concerning isolated states of affairs are replaced by an emphasis on the 
concrete situations in which knowing occurs. Important notions like rational­
ity and objectivity lose their central place to responsibility and acknowledge­
ment. I claim that in this way the biblical understanding of reality as God's 
creation can be better appreciated than in approaches that take their starting 
point in Greek and modern philosophical conceptions.
I. Introduction
When in everyday life we claim to know, we usually have something 
or someone concrete in mind.1 We know John Brown or we do not. We 
know New York or we do not. We know the way to Amsterdam or we 
do not. We know when the Berlin wall was broken down or we do not. 
The last example might easily figure in a theoretical discussion too, the 
others less likely so. The reason for this is that epistemology is usually 
concerned with beliefs and their content in terms of propositions. And, 
although the knowledge claimed in the first three examples does imply 
beliefs and propositions, it is too encompassing and vague to be expressed 
by a specific and limited number of them. In theory we like our examples 
to be clear and well defined. The content of the beliefs discussed, there­
fore, needs to be simple and, most of the time, represents isolated states 
of affairs.
In this essay I will look at knowing and knowledge from the perspec­
tive of the biblical view of creation. In doing so I will make a double cir­
cuit. The first round will start with a brief outline of the biblical belief 
in creation. I will then offer a provisional description of two important 
tendencies in epistemological thought, taking my cue from Plato's cave 
parable and Descartes's doubt experiment, and show, in a few essential 
matters, where tensions with the belief in creation occur. The second 
round will try to develop a different theoretical perspective on knowledge 
against the background of the biblical belief in creation and by means of
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the structural theory of Reformational philosophy.2 To bring out its dis­
tinctive character, I will contrast this approach with the views discussed 
before. Though I will argue that knowledge must do justice to its object, 
I make no such pretension with regard to my discussion of Plato and 
Descartes. Their views are discussed only in order to reveal certain fun­
damental tendencies in thought on knowledge which, I believe, are still 
relevant today.
The focus of the discussion will be on the conception of knowledge. But 
the view of reality as such cannot be ignored. Epistemology and ontology 
will prove to be intimately connected. It will appear that Reformational 
philosophy is closer to the everyday understanding of knowledge than 
epistemology is accustomed to be. The view of knowledge in terms of 
beliefs and propositions concerning isolated states of affairs will be re­
placed by an approach which emphasizes knowledge in the context of 
concrete relationships. Instead of taking knowledge in a universal sense, 
a diversity of knowing situations, each with its own kind of normativity, 
will be explored. Important notions like rationality and objectivity will 
lose their central place to responsibility and acknowledgement. It is my 
contention that in this way the biblical understanding of reality as God's 
creation can be better appreciated than in those approaches that take their 
starting point in Greek and modern philosophical conceptions.
II. An Outline o f Two Traditions and their Contrast with the Notion of Creation
2.1 The Biblical Belief in Creation and its Relevance to Human Knowledge
Heidegger once said that the Christian belief in creation offers too easy an 
answer to the question of reality's true nature.3 The answer: everything is 
created by God! is given before the weight of the question has been able to 
sink in. It is in fact true that the belief in creation is in a certain sense prior 
to any inquiry into reality. It is itself not a result of study. But we should 
equally emphasize that, correctly understood, it is far from an easy answer. 
To say that reality is God-created is to refer to a deep, unfathomable mys­
tery. We may enter this mystery, but it does not become transparent to us. 
This is strikingly formulated in Psalm 139. The poet expresses there how he 
cannot comprehend the knowledge which God as his Maker has of him.
O Lord, thou has searched me and known me . . .
Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
it is high, I cannot attain it.4
The enduring mystery of creation is also indicated by the multitude of 
expressions which the story of the creation in Genesis requires to describe 
the creation. I want to look briefly at two of these: creating as making and 
creating as commanding.
2.1.1 Creating as Making
And God said, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters,
and let it separate the waters from the waters . . . . " And God made
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the great two lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser 
light to rule the night; he made the stars also. . . . And God made the 
beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the cattle according 
to their kinds. . . . And God saw that it was good. . . . Then God said, 
"Let us make man . . . ."5
These images present God as a craftsman or artist who carefully and lov­
ingly creates a work of art and enjoys it. The result reveals his wisdom, 
skill, power. The small details—the fine tissue of butterfly wings, neuro­
physiological processes—bespeak his great care, the immense energy in 
the universe which contracts and expands in the birth and death of stars 
bespeaks his unimaginable power.
Two comments are required straightaway. (1) The examples given make 
it clear that belief in creation stimulates rather than hampers the study of 
reality, as is in fact shown by the development of natural science in the 
sixteenth century and later. We should put it even more strongly. Someone 
in a museum who looks at a work of art that he does not understand, and 
then reads the name of an artist unfamiliar to him, does not profit much 
from the knowledge that this particular name is connected to this work 
of art. It remains meaningless. Real knowledge grows only when insight 
into the work of art is gained and the person behind the name takes on an 
identity. The same goes for God's creation. Precisely as creation, reality 
calls for careful inquiry against the background of the Name by which 
God revealed himself. This brings me to my second, related comment.
(2) A tension becomes readily visible between the investigation of real­
ity and the Name by which God is known. The Name of God in the Bible is 
expressive of goodness and mercy. This is personified in Jesus Christ as he 
is characterized in the New Testament. The reality of nature and history is 
full of cruelty. How can the Name of the Creator be bound up with this? 
At the very least we have to say that the creation has not remained whole. 
The work of art is full of cracks. Through the cracks we can still discern the 
original lines. But sometimes it becomes difficult, if not impossible. It is 
clear that reality cannot be simply labelled 'creation of God.' The connec­
tion of God's Name, as it is confessed in the Christian faith, with existing 
reality therefore remains a matter of faith. The creation as mystery does 
not become transparent by itself. The disruption and degeneration as a 
result of evil threatens to make it an insoluble riddle. Yet the mystery re­
mains accessible. Faith in the revealed Name begins to recognize contours 
of the creation's intention, though many pressing questions remain.
2.1.2 Creating as Commanding
And God said, "Let there be light"; and there was light. . . . And God 
said, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters . . . ." And it 
was so. . . . And God said, "Let the waters under the heavens be gath­
ered together in one place " And it was so. And God said, "Let there
be lights in the firmament . . . ." And it was so. And God said . . . .6
The most characteristic feature of the creation story in Genesis is the recur­
rent phrase 'and God said,' followed by the creative command itself and
the realization of what is called into being.7 Psalm 33 expresses the same 
idea succinctly as:
For he spoke, and it came to be;
he commanded, and it stood forth.8
The absolute dependence of the created on the Creator is expressed here 
in two ways. The image of the craftsman or artist already brings out the 
Maker's close bond with his work. Great care and attention is lavished on 
the detail. There is an intimate presence of the sculptor in the sculpture via 
his fingers which mould the plaster or via the chisel and hammer which 
tool the stone and wood. Creating by calling into being adds another di­
mension. No longer is there a given material which offers opportunities 
but also imposes limits on what the artist can do. The creation takes place 
from inside, as it were. The word calls into being 'out of nothing' and thus 
the creature becomes real.
A second element is related to this. Creating as making suggests a cer­
tain independence of the result vis-a-vis the Creator. When the work of 
art is finished, it has its own existence independent of the maker. Creating 
as a command to exist implies a lasting dependence. The execution of a 
command remains geared to the command itself. Detachment from the 
command results in disobedience. Conversely, if the command is with­
drawn, the execution loses its foundation. Command and execution are 
dynamically involved in an asymmetrical relationship of dependence.
But the creation is not just about dependence. 'And God saw that it 
was good.' The result of creation is more than a neutral, factual being- 
there. Anybody who knows anything about the Creator would not have 
expected otherwise. The quality of the work of art is guaranteed by who 
the artist is. This also applies to the command in relation to who gives 
it. But in this respect, too, the relationship is even more intimate. Execu­
tion and command are geared to each other. Obeying a good command 
leads to something good. A bad command leads to evil. In this way the 
command to exist determines intrinsically the quality of that which ex­
ists. Because of the goodness of the Creator creating as commanding can 
therefore be characterized as a promise-command to exist. Creating is a 
normative notion. And this brings us back to the tension mentioned in 
connection with creating as making: the opacity of that which exists as 
creation. The promise does not seem to have been fulfilled. At the very 
least there is a tension between the purport of the command and the way 
it is executed. A proper understanding of creating as commanding cannot 
ignore evil either. Reality does not live up to the high expectations we 
may justly have.9 Knowledge of the Creator cannot only be acquired from 
what exists.
2.1.3 The Significance for Human Knowledge
In the Christian tradition, gaining knowledge of reality has often been 
compared with reading a book. God is seen as the Author of a text. People 
can try to read it. The metaphor of a book is sometimes used both for 
the creation and for its development in history, sometimes specifically 
for nature, which gives the wrong impression that creation is confined to
240 Faith and Philosophy
KNOWING WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CREATION 241
nature. For an understanding of reality as creation, though, it is a good 
metaphor. It shows that reality as creation is full of intrinsic meaning and 
that it refers to the Creator. Both elements should set the tone for the way 
human knowledge deals with reality. The metaphor of the text with its 
author, for all that it is a new image, is a natural sequel to the notions 
of creating as making and creating as commanding. Creational relation­
ship implies the qualitative meaning of the created. And knowledge here 
should lead to acknowledgement. Yet time and again we find that the text 
has not remained whole. Hence it is sometimes hard to understand and 
the text sometimes seems at odds with the character of the Author. This, 
too, should be considered when we read.
Human knowing brings us to our own position in reality as creation. 
Genesis 1 talks about this too. Humankind forms an integral part of cre­
ation. But our distinctive place is emphasized too:
And God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; 
and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the 
birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over 
every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." So God created 
man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and 
female he created them.10
The position of power awarded to us over our fellow creatures is certainly 
not unlimited. The governing norm is indicated by the recurrent motif 
'And God saw that it was good.' The Creator's intention for his creation 
must also be brought out in humankind's stewardship over it. This means 
that justice is done to the distinctive nature of all creatures.
Humankind's distinctive position and the norm governing it are well 
expressed in the story of Genesis 2 about Adam's naming of the animals. 
As he names them, so they will be called. But it is also clear that the names 
are not given at random. Names name and are consequently more than 
a numeric code. Language must put into words the meaning of reality. 
Knowledge of and conduct towards our fellow creatures come together 
here. The starting-point for both is always the 'fear of the Lord.'
Gen. 1 mainly develops the idea of our uniqueness in relation to our 
non-human fellow creatures. To gain a broader perspective on the mean­
ing of the expression 'image of God,' we should juxtapose Genesis 1 with 
Jesus' answer to the question of the great commandment:
"You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all 
your soul, and with all your mind. This is the great and first com­
mandment. And a second is like it, You shall love your neighbour as 
yourself. On these two commandments depend all the law and the 
prophets."11
Jesus' words indicate our purpose in life. We are made with this intention. 
In other words, Jesus indicates the fundamental framework for the acqui­
sition of self-knowledge, which should characterize all our knowledge, 
indeed our entire existence, since our self-understanding is expressed in 
our entire existence. Jesus' words indicate that our self-understanding is
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determined by our position towards God and our neighbour. The love 
commandment points out how these relations are fulfilled, and thus how 
the Maker's intention with his image becomes visible. If we look at the 
words of the great commandment against the background of creating as 
promise-command to exist, its meaning for human self-understanding 
and knowing in general is brought out even more clearly. The promise- 
command to exist as a creative word to humankind means that two basic 
elements characterize our existence: responsibility and calling as an an­
swer to the command component and desire and expectation as a response 
to the promise component. Both constitute our existence as human. They 
typify the way we exist. And this also applies to our knowledge and con­
duct towards our fellow creatures in all the relations in which we exist. 
These involve responsibility and expectation, response and desire, because 
we exist in God's creation. The love commandment indicates how calling 
and desire can be fulfilled on our part. It also shows how our actual exis­
tence has become alienated, both from the command and the promise, and 
from their fulfilment.
2.2 The Rationality M otif in Greek Philosophy and Plato's Parable of the Cave
In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only 
with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness. Once it is 
perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the 
cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives 
birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the 
intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without 
having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either 
in his own life or in matters of state.12
These words of Plato in the seventh book of The Republic form a central 
statement in his discussion of justice. They are designed to show that just 
action in politics depends on orientation to the idea of the good. They are 
part of his explanation of the cave parable and should therefore be under­
stood against the background of the human condition which it portrays.
People can be compared to prisoners in an underground prison. They 
are chained in such a way that they cannot move from their position or 
even move their head from left to right. They can only look straight ahead. 
High behind them burns a great fire. Its light throws shadows on the wall 
in front of them, shadows of objects and images which are carried past 
behind them. The shadows of the carriers themselves are invisible. For 
the prisoners are seated with their back against a wall and only the car­
ried objects rise above it. The voices of the people can be heard, but only 
via echoes against the wall in front of the prisoners, so that the shadows 
themselves seem to speak.
This is what reality looks like to the prisoners. As far as they know, this 
is reality: shadows of images of real objects, animals and people. Only 
when prisoners are freed and led from the darkness of the cave to the light 
of the sun do they come to see reality as it truly is. But it takes time and 
effort before the eyes get used to this reality. Only at the very end can they 
be raised to the sun, to the light to which all reality owes its visibility. From
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the perspective of the cave-dwellers this reality is unimaginable. When 
the prisoners return, their story is not believed, the more so because their 
eyes, now used to daylight, can no longer make out the shadows on the 
cave wall.
Plato's parable is an allegory of human knowledge. We are no better off 
than the prisoners in the cave. Our everyday reality is nothing but shad­
ows of images of real things. Philosophers who have seen the truth could 
disabuse us. But they are ridiculed. As a result, we are shut off from real 
insight and the possibility of acting wisely. The idea of the Good eludes us. 
Someone who refuses to follow the path to real knowledge or, unable to 
do so himself, refuses to listen to those who have gained true insight, has 
not only limited his scope to 'believing' instead of 'knowing,' he has also 
cut off the road to correct action.
At first sight it is not surprising that Christians later felt attracted to these 
views of Plato. Didn't they, too, believe in the need to be saved from a 
sinful existence alienated from God? Didn't Plato's idea of the Good refer 
to God himself, who is also called the Light of the world and on whom 
everything depends? For Plato, the Idea was not 'just an idea,' but the 
highest reality. Christians did, of course, recognize that evil in human be­
ings is not only a matter of ignorance or stupidity, but that their will plays 
an important part too. But this addition was not a real obstacle to adoption 
of Plato's ideas.
Yet this connection between Christian faith and elements of Greek phi­
losophy puts pressure on essential elements of biblical faith. For Plato, 
intellectual thought is the prime entranceway to knowledge of reality.13 
Consequently, this thought becomes the criterion for what true reality is 
assumed to be. That is why Plato sees the world of ideas as more real 
than concretely experienced everyday reality. It is the reality in which 
people live and to which they therefore must always return, but it is also 
the world from which they must be freed if their humanity is to achieve 
its true goal.
There are at least two points on which this view conflicts with the bibli­
cal belief in creation. (1) Reality is divided into higher and lower. This 
emerges very clearly in Plato's theory of the human soul. He distinguishes 
three parts here: the appetitive, the spirited, and mind. The first is the 
source of evil according to Plato. In his mind, man is akin to the gods and 
like these has access to the reality of the ideas, unless he is prevented by 
sensual desire. Thus mind is set against the senses, the intellectual against 
the material. The created itself displays a tension between higher and 
lower. Corporeality is in danger of being undervalued. The origin of evil is 
located somewhere in creation. This violates the integral character of cre­
ation as expressed in the Bible. Everything is no longer good 'by nature,' 
as created. The distance to the Idea of the Good, supreme being, becomes 
determinative. What is farther away from supreme being becomes more 
characterised by non-being. Creation thus becomes a connection of being 
and non-being. As such it is seen to be defective.
(2) The second point is directly connected with the defective being of 
the created. The being by which all that exists is measured has an abso­
lute character. It is divine in nature. In other words, the criterion for the
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created is no longer itself creatural, so that it can be judged according 
to its nature. Divine being is taken as criterion for the created. This is 
borne out by Plato's theory of knowledge. Though Plato emphasizes that 
people are distinct from the gods precisely in the nature of their cog- 
nition—the gods have absolute knowledge, people can only aspire to it 
(philo-sophy)-yet precisely this shows that the knowledge of the gods 
is seen to be the ideal of knowledge. It becomes the standard by which 
human knowledge is judged. Absolute knowledge of an absolute reality 
therefore becomes the ideal. The finiteness of both knowledge and reality 
implied in createdness is thus misunderstood in its positive nature ('And 
God saw that it was good').
2.3 The Subject-object Scheme of Modern Philosophy and Descartes's 
Doubt Experiment
For a long time I had remarked that it is sometimes requisite in com­
mon life to follow opinions which one knows to be most uncertain,
exactly as though they were indisputable___But because in this case
I wished to give myself entirely to the search after Truth, I thought 
that it was necessary for me to take an apparently opposite course, 
and to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imag­
ine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there re­
mained anything in my belief that was entirely certain.14
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is mainly known for his methodological doubt: 
by systematically trying out how far his doubt can go, he wants to find an 
absolutely certain starting-point from which the edifice of knowledge can 
be rebuilt. His doubt mainly concerns three points. The senses sometimes 
deceive us and so Descartes assumes for a moment that the senses delude 
us in all cases. Arguments are prone to error and so Descartes rejects for 
a moment all arguments which he had previously considered valid. We 
have all kinds of images both when we dream and when we are awake. 
Descartes therefore assumes for a moment that all his images have no 
more reality than when they occur in his dreams. And then he realizes 
that 'from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, 
it very evidently and certainly followed that I was.'15 To his mind he has 
thus found the starting-point for his philosophy, or to be more precise, for 
knowledge of the truth.
A striking feature of the above quotation is that Descartes does not 
connect the search for certain truth with action. Action, says Descartes, 
is often based on something uncertain, even though it is necessary to 
assume absolute certainty. We might conclude that Descartes's doubt 
experiment is not concerned with action at all. This would be a wrong 
conclusion, as we can see from a different place. In the second part of his 
account Descartes mentions a number of examples in which it is attrac­
tive but actually unfeasible to demolish an existing structure and rebuild 
it: a city which has been built in the course of time by different architects, 
so that it makes a disorderly impression; or a lawbook to which new 
laws have gradually been added, so that its original coherence is lost. 
And he continues:
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But as regards all the opinions which up to this time I had embraced,
I thought I could not do better than endeavour once for all to sweep 
them completely away, so that they might later on be replaced, either 
by others which were better, or by the same, when I had made them 
conform to the uniformity of a rational scheme. And I firmly believed 
that by this means I should succeed in directing my life much better 
than if I had only built on old foundations, and relied on principles 
of which I allowed myself to be in youth persuaded without having 
inquired into their truth.16
This quotation shows that Descartes's demolition-reconstruction experi­
ment also serves practical purposes, even though he subjects it to all kinds 
of restrictions. He is clearly concerned with a ideal of knowledge for sci­
ence, but he also envisages practical results allowing application of the 
acquired knowledge. The consequences of his project therefore do not 
remain purely academic. Because the method for the reconstruction of 
knowledge is derived from mathematics and so links up with the math­
ematical method of natural science, its practical application deeply affects 
the nature of reality. In this sense Descartes's enterprise is totally revolu­
tionary: the old must be demolished and built up from scratch. This does 
not take place directly but only via the way in which action takes shape 
and direction—but the effects are no less radical. The traditional basis of 
action in acquired convictions and views is replaced (where possible) with 
scientific analyses and reconstructions by means of natural science.
The consequences of this revolution are radical, because after the de­
molition-reconstruction procedure all extra-conscious reality is seen as 
something that can be understood and controlled by means of the math­
ematical-scientific method. It is not deemed to have any other quality than 
that which can be represented by mathematical means. In practice this 
means that it is seen as being without qualities. It is nothing but material 
that as such does not yet possess meaning. Its nature can be computed 
and then manipulated in such a way that it becomes serviceable to chosen 
ends. This gives rise to the idea of an objective reality without intrinsic 
value, without inherent normative limits to how it is dealt with. Meaning 
and significance can only be derived from the human subject. The result is 
a sharp distinction of values and norms on the one hand and facts on the 
other. Facts are objective, values and norms belong to the subject.
The first consequence of the Cartesian revolution has mainly to do with 
the method chosen for reconstruction: mathematical-scientific thought. But 
the way Descartes believed he could reach a certain starting-point had pro­
found consequences too. The turn to the subject in the doubt experiment 
means that human consciousness is placed in opposition to reality. 'I think, 
therefore I am' was the point where Descartes ended up. This could not be 
doubted. The great problem was: how do you get away from there?
Descartes finds his starting-point in consciousness. This may provide a 
starting-point for certain knowledge, but not yet certainty of the knowl­
edge itself. The doubt experiment can be set up in a different way too. If 
I look out of the window, I see trees, houses and cars. Now I can imagine 
that I am dreaming. For sometimes I see the same things in my dreams. 
So I can wonder whether reality corresponds to my images. But there is
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no point in wondering whether I really have the images which I see. The 
images are immediately certain in my consciousness. I cannot meaning­
fully doubt them. The question is whether there is something outside of 
my consciousness that corresponds to these images.
Precisely because Descartes's doubt experiment withdraws to the un­
assailable certainty of the individual consciousness, the outside world 
becomes a problem. And this problem is not really solved by the math­
ematical-scientific method. Though it can point to great successes, sci­
entific knowledge, in Descartes's thought, remains mind-constructed 
knowledge. The method is a method of the mind or consciousness. And 
so the question remains whether and how reality corresponds to it. The 
question of certainty of knowledge with its answer in the undeniable fact 
of consciousness and the reliability of scientific method means that the 
character of knowledge as true to reality remains problematical.17
Certainly Descartes did not intend to cast doubt on the Christian faith. 
Indeed, faith in God plays an indispensable role in reconstructing the 
edifice of knowledge. The fact that an immediately evident insight can 
be trusted depends on the truthfulness of God, who does not deceive us, 
says Descartes. Yet it is clear that his revolution in thought clashes with 
the biblical belief in creation. This is easy to see if we look at the two con­
sequences mentioned.
If reality is viewed extra-consciously as material without intrinsic quality, 
it can hardly still be seen as a work of art that expresses the greatness of its 
creator. Once again the metaphor of the text can help to clarify the meaning 
of the separation between norms and values on the one hand and facts on 
the other. Subject-object thinking forces us to view the text as a fortuitous 
result, e.g., of a word-processor operated by a monkey. The print-out can 
be tested for all kinds of regularities: the nature of letter combinations, fre­
quency of letters, etc. Everything can be computed. We can even make pre­
dictions. But the 'text' does not have meaning. Someone who says: 'what a 
beautiful poem!' has given it a meaning which is not intrinsically present 
on paper. There is no author. The text produced in this way is not based on 
meaning-giving intentionality. If we consider extra-conscious reality to be 
without intrinsic meaning, and therefore without intrinsic limits to what 
may be done with it, we leave its Creator out of the picture.
The same applies to the starting-point in consciousness. The connec­
tion between humankind and the reality surrounding him, a connection 
implied in creation, cannot be ignored without detracting from created- 
ness itself. The creation comprehends humankind and world. And the 
latter cannot be constructed on the basis of the former. Any such attempt 
must somehow put the human subject in the place of the Creator. In fact 
the very search for absolute certainty goes against a recognition of our 
creatureliness. It is an attempt to transcend the vulnerable finiteness of the 
human condition by refusing to be satisfied with the creatural possibilities 
and aspiring to a 'God's-eye point of view.'
III. Knowledge and Rationality: Two Metaphors
The striking thing about Plato's cave parable is that, to explain what he 
means by true knowledge, he uses the metaphor of seeing—but sensory
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cognition is precisely what he wants to move away from. Its orientation, 
he says, is to the shadows of images of true reality. Only the mind or the 
intellectual part of the soul is able to know the true reality of the ideas. Not 
the senses but thought gives access to truth. Yet he uses a visual metaphor 
for this. Mind is interpreted as an ability to 'see.' We can compare the 
word 'insight.' The word 'theory' originally has this background too, with 
the meaning 'to see intellectually.' If we examine the history of Western 
thought, we find that the metaphor of seeing has strongly shaped the con­
ception of intellectual cognition.
In modern times the visual metaphor has retreated into the background 
somewhat. It has gradually been overtaken by the idea of 'rationality.' This 
idea is more concerned with the arguments that can be given for a par­
ticular view. Argumentation itself becomes determinative. Method takes 
prime position. Yet the goal continues to be (theoretical) insight. Indeed, 
as Descartes's discourse on method shows, insight is indispensable at the 
beginning and at every stage of argumentation, at any rate if it is to lead to 
valid knowledge. So there remains a connection between the modern idea 
of rationality and Plato's visual metaphor. Hence we use 'rationality' here 
to describe this entire way of thinking that goes back to Plato.
An entirely different metaphor functions in the biblical creation belief. 
If creation can be expounded in terms of a promise-command to exist, the 
created can be interpreted as an answer to this. The metaphor here refers 
less to knowing than to reality itself. But just as the visual metaphor for 
knowing has consequences in Plato for the conception of reality, so the 
answering or hearing metaphor for created reality must have implications 
for the way that knowing is understood.
The rest of this essay will take these two metaphors as its starting-point. 
First the metaphor of seeing will be used to say more about the concep­
tion of reality implied in the view of knowing that comes with the idea 
of rationality. Then the metaphor of hearing will be used to explore the 
understanding of reality based on the belief in creation, in order to outline 
the distinctive character of the related view of knowledge.
3.1 Rationality and the Metaphor of Seeing
It is easy to recognize why Plato chose the metaphor of seeing to explain 
what he wanted to say. After all, everybody who can use their eyes knows 
about shadows, images, reflections, and real things. In this way Plato en­
listed visual reality to illustrate distinctions for which metaphors derived 
from (sensory) hearing would be inadequate. We could point to the echo 
which we sometimes hear. But this, too, involves real sounds which are 
governed by the same laws as the sound which produces the echo. This 
does not apply to shadow images created when objects are placed in a 
strong light. This metaphor can illustrate the existence of various degrees 
of reality. But the visual metaphor has even more possibilities.
When we make a sketch of something we have seen, a special house 
or a striking tree, we will, in most cases, not just indicate a number of 
colours on paper, but first of all try to draw the form. The visible form of 
things allows us to recognize them. Hence the world is experienced very 
differently by those who cannot see. We identify things primarily by their 
visual form.
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Clearly this is not the way Plato wants to go when he describes reality 
in terms of ideas. True reality cannot be grasped by the senses. But Plato 
does use the orientation of our seeing to form. The visual form becomes a 
metaphor for what is visible to the mind's eye. It is not sketched by means 
of lines and surfaces, but by concepts and definitions. Not the external 
form which we apprehend with the sensory eye indicates the essence of 
things, but the internal form which we see with the eye of the intellect. Not 
the drawing shows what things are, but the concept of which words (or 
nowadays formulas) form the best expression.
Plato's turn from the senses to the mind thus involves a radical change 
in the concept of form as the mark of thing identity. His entire view of real­
ity is bound up with this. Three points in particular are important here.
(1) The forms we see with our eyes are all subject to change. Some forms 
change rapidly, like smoke coming out of a chimney. Others change more 
gradually, like trees that grow: at first relatively fast, later very slowly. 
Some forms seem constant through the centuries, like rocks made of hard 
stone. But they too have a beginning and an end. For Plato, the forms seen 
by the mind do not. Trees come into being and die, but the same cannot be 
said of the concept 'tree.' What a tree is endures forever. Plato thus places 
form as concept or idea outside of time. Insight into form means access to 
an unchanging, eternal reality, a reality which therefore possesses greater 
reality than the concretely experienced world of generation and death. 
Hence knowledge of this reality can have an absolute character.
(2) Someone who focuses his attention on the form of a tree or a house 
will mostly look at it without noticing the surroundings. We can also 
look at the overall picture, even at the relations between various forms. 
In general, though, concentration on form isolates the object from its en­
vironment. This element returns in the focus on intellectually seen form, 
certainly in Plato. A definition tries to see something in itself. This is what 
Aristotle will later call the substance. Characteristically, the substance does 
not need anything else for its existence. In this it differs from properties, 
which occur only in things. A tree can be seen in itself. The colour brown 
never occurs as such. It is always the colour of something.
Another, related element comes into play here. Concentrated percep­
tion tends to objectify. This association is certainly implied in the word 
'to observe.' When an object or even a person is observed, some kind of 
distance takes place between the observer and his object. This does not 
mean that the observer is not interested. He may watch with great absorp­
tion, even admiration. Yet he looks at an 'object' as if it exists in itself, not 
in a specific relation to him as observer. Or really it is the other way round. 
Because seeing is not integrated in a specific relation, it is the perceptual 
relation itself which bestows a certain character on seeing. As a result, the 
object seems to be seen in itself. As if it exists as such.
The above descriptions try to make something clear about the self­
subsistence of reality as implied in the Platonic metaphor of visual form. 
The ideas are seen in their being-as-such. Herein lies the essence of things. 
This does not mean that there are no relations between the ideas. There 
certainly are. But these relations are abstract, not concrete. There is an 
affinity between the ideas and the intellectual part of the soul. That is 
why they can be known. There is an interrelation between the ideas, and
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certainly the relation to the One or the Good is important. But there is still 
something of a world in itself whose being-as-such is determined by the 
objectifying visual perspective. That is why only theoretical cognition can 
do justice to this being.
(3) Someone who takes sensory form as the starting-point for describing 
something is usually aware that more can be said about it. This is certainly 
true in the case of people. Reality is too complex and too rich to be ad­
equately characterized in sensory terms. This no longer goes without say­
ing for the 'form' which the mind sees. After all, the idea is that the concept 
as 'form' indicates the essence of things. Of all 'things,' including human 
reality. In this sense the world of ideas is homogenous or uniform. Every­
thing essential can, in principle, be understood by thought on the basis 
of the ideas. In Plato himself there remains a clear awareness of diversity, 
precisely because reality as a whole does not coincide with the ideas. It is 
determined in the nature of its being by its relation to the ideas. Reality is 
stretched between the being of the ideas, or what transcends it, and non­
being. After Plato this even leads to an elaborate hierarchy of being. If, as 
in Descartes, it is assumed that reality can be reconstructed by means of 
mathematical-scientific concepts, it becomes possible, in principle, to in­
terpret reality as a system of concepts. This is in fact what happened. The 
diversity of reality is reduced to an intellectual or rational system.
If in this way, on the basis of the metaphor of seeing for knowing, the 
'form' which Plato saw in the ideas comes to determine his view of reality, 
the latter in its turn is reflected in his view of knowing. The rational form 
becomes the criterion for true cognition. It is this 'form' to which cognition 
is orientated and which returns in cognition as the concept. The concept 
as 'form' in cognition must reflect the form which constitutes the essence 
of things, just as a sketch of a tree must represent its form in reality. In 
the sensory form there can be no question of real identity, if only because 
the drawing is a representation on a flat surface without the three-dimen­
sional space of reality itself. This restriction does not apply to the form 
which the mind sees, unless the concept is mistakenly identified with the 
word by which it is expressed. Thought as such does not have this restric­
tion. We have thus returned to the identity of thought and being posited 
by Parmenides: truth becomes a correspondence between knowledge and 
reality, not just in the sense that one corresponds to the other, but as iden­
tity in form.18 Knowledge must be capable of expression in terms which 
refer to self-subsistent being. And just as the being of the rational form is 
far removed from concretely experienced reality, so true knowledge can­
not be orientated to it either. The distinction between 'knowledge' and 
'opinion' is thus made clear. The first applies to the rational reality of the 
ideas, the second to the concrete reality of the senses. The first, if attained, 
is unchanging and eternal, in short: absolute; the second is relative and 
transitory. It is clear which of the two is to be preferred.
3.2 Normativity and the Metaphor of Hearing19
By talking about cognition and reality in metaphors of seeing, Plato can 
easily distinguish between the true reality of the ideas and the shadowy 
reality of ordinary phenomena. The ideas form the criterion by which the 
phenomena are judged. And these are always found to be defective. The
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particular nature of the concrete phenomenon can never express the idea 
in its generality. There is always a limitation. This tree is never 'the' tree 
in its fullness. For this very reason the general idea has a greater reality 
than the concrete phenomenon. In fact the relationship is one-sided. The 
concrete phenomenon depends on the general idea. That is why it is what 
it is, why this tree is 'tree.' But the dependence is not mutual. The concept 
of tree does not rely on concrete trees.
The relation between the concrete and the general looks very different 
when we examine it against the background of the metaphor of hearing 
as it functions in creation belief. Creation can be seen here as a command- 
promise to exist. The general element that can be heard in a command or a 
promise is directly related to the concrete action by which it is carried out. 
Examples may clarify this.
'The shop has to be evacuated at once. There has been a bomb alarm!' 
This summons is addressed to everyone in the building who hears it, on 
whatever floor or in whatever corner they happen to be. In this sense it 
is a general command and everybody must do the same. But it is also 
clear that if everybody acts or moves in the same way, evacuation of the 
building will descend into chaos. How the general order is carried out 
depends on the particular circumstances of the individual. The command 
is directly related to these circumstances. Only in concrete circumstances 
can a command be executed. These do not form a limitation, they are im­
plied in the understanding and execution of the command.
'I will follow you wherever you go,' someone says to Jesus in the Gos­
pel. Someone who makes such a promise cannot be sure of what he is 
actually saying. He cannot know in advance where Jesus will go. Yet all 
these possible situations are implied in his promise. The promise is gen­
eral, but as such, as promise, it relates to all the relevant situations. Jesus' 
answer is therefore a warning: 'Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have 
nests; but the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head.' (Matt. 8:20)
A promise or command with general import is geared as command or 
promise to the concrete situations which it covers. There is no question 
of a dual reality as there is in the general as idea. Even though there is no 
symmetrical relation, the general command and the concrete execution 
are geared to each other, depend on each other. Applied to reality, the 
norm for phenomena does not reside in an ideal reality which exists in 
itself and of which they can only be a poor reflection. The norm lies in 
the promise-command to be, which even as a general call is geared to the 
particular phenomena and which can uniquely come into its own in every 
phenomenon. The particular circumstances do not detract from the reality 
of command and promise, they form an essential part of it.20
The metaphor of hearing in the sense of responding to a promise or 
command implies a different view of reality compared with Plato's visual 
metaphor.
(1) Plato's conception of rational form allowed him to see true reality 
as an eternal, unchanging world. The phenomena are in time. The ideas 
to which they relate are not. If reality as a whole exists as an answer to 
a word of creation, interpreted as a promise-command to be, its logical 
place is to be integrally in time. After all, it takes time to carry out a com­
mand or promise. Time is the trajectory along which being-as-answer is
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realized. The concrete existence in time is fully real. As such is does not 
suffer from a deficiency of being, like the world of phenomena in Plato. 
The criterion is not absolute form, but being-an-answer to the promise- 
command to be.
Contrary to what Plato thought, it is not necessary to think the essence 
of the tree by which it is tree, the idea or the concept, as being out of time. 
The concept of a tree does not in fact perish with the tree itself. But this is 
not to say that the concept itself is out of time. The concept which we form 
of things clearly belongs to our temporary existence. True enough, it is 
not bound up with particular individuals, it has constancy through time. 
But it does not exist separately from temporary human existence. This 
is also shown by the changes which concepts, too, undergo. Plato called 
that which makes a tree a tree an idea, but it is better to call it a structure. 
A structure also has a certain constancy, but there is no reason to see it as 
raised above time. Rather it is a constant structure in time, and this con­
stancy need not even exclude change.
The structure of a thing can be viewed as a complex of rules, as in the 
game of chess. These rules apply to every game that can be called chess. 
They determine its distinctive character and make this game the game of 
chess. They also make it possible. Without rules no game as such can exist. 
They can therefore be called constitutive. If we try to incorporate rules in 
the metaphor of the promise-command to exist, we can say that the rules 
are implied in the promise-command. It gives the rules for what exists as 
answer to it. It gives structure. Even if the promise-command itself would 
not be regarded as in time, this does not apply to the structure which 
determines the phenomena in their own nature.
(2) Command and promise are as such geared to the circumstances in 
which they obtain. Their execution is always connected with the particular 
nature of the situation in which they take place. If we look at the existence 
of things through the prism of this metaphor, they will not be seen in iso­
lation from the relations in which they exist. Whereas the focus on form 
tends to separate things from the concrete relationships in which they ex­
ist, if existence is seen as an answer in a particular situation, the relations 
in which things function must be coinvolved in the concept. 'Everything is 
connected with everything': this also applies to the way things exist.
At the same time this metaphor can make it clear that things do not 
primarily exist as objects of observation. It is not the perceptual relation 
which determines the character of things, but their being-an-answer. Ev­
erything that exists is an active subject in this sense. It may exist as such 
and has a right to be acknowledged in its integral existence. Things exist 
as an answer to the creative word. This characterizes their being-there, not 
the fact that they can be seen as an object.21
(3) The metaphor of seeing, as used by Plato, awards an exclusive place 
to rationality and mind. The sensory world has a second-rate status. The 
view of existence as answer tries to do justice to the integral meaning of 
things. All aspects are included, according to their nature, in the being- 
an-answer of things. Moreover, a diversity of aspects can be distinguished 
which is much richer than that of sensation and mind. Even the physical 
and the sensory cannot be reduced to each other. The entire diversity of 
aspects analyzed in Reformational philosophy22 could be mentioned here.
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The special relation between thought and being no longer obtains. The 
same applies to the exclusive connection of concrete experience with sen­
sation. All aspects are part of the being of things and are involved in the 
way they are experienced.
If reality is interpreted in this way as existing integrally in time, with a 
great diversity of structures and relations, real precisely in its concreteness 
and pervaded in all this by normativity, the conception of knowledge will 
have to be different too. Four points in particular are important here.
(1) If the Platonic distinction between the true or ultimate reality of uni­
versal ideas and the secondary world of concrete appearances loses its 
validity, the nature of philosophical or scientific in contrast to everyday 
knowledge needs reinterpretation. Its characterisation in terms of knowl­
edge concerning what is essential or ultimate over against mere opinion 
based upon subjective experience can no longer be maintained. Theoreti­
cal knowledge has its advantages because it is based on method and well- 
defined concepts. At the same time, precisely for this reason, it is often 
abstract and, therefore, farther away from integral reality than everyday 
knowledge in practical situations.
(2) It is not rationality which determines the validity of knowledge, but 
whether justice is done to things. In their own nature things ask to be 
acknowledged. Because this is not determined by some or other rational 
form, rationality cannot be the primary criterion for knowledge. All as­
pects of experience should function according to their nature. The sensory 
and the logical, but also for instance language and faith. The important 
thing is to watch and listen closely, think and argue lucidly, choose the 
right words to render the meaning of things and to have a sound perspec­
tive in which all this receives its own place and the ultimate meaning of 
reality can be understood. Only in this way can justice be done to integral 
existence. Openness and precision are crucial.
(3) To know is to respond to the call for acknowledgement implied 
in existence. But existence itself is not absolute. It is always determined 
by concrete situations and circumstances. It is in relation. This returns in 
knowledge. Different situations involve different criteria for knowledge, 
precisely with a view to doing justice to things. A mother knows her child 
differently from a doctor in a consultation room. A painter knows his paint 
differently from an analyst in a laboratory. And this is how it should be. 
The existence of things cannot be laid down by a certain approach, by some 
or other definition. It is open and in relation. The plurality of relations is 
matched by a plurality of ways of knowing, each with its own normativity. 
And just as each situation has an individual character, because e.g., justice 
or love or sickness or money is involved, so knowledge can be typically 
characterized by a certain aspect of reality.23 Reality is many-sided and 
open, never absolute. The same goes for knowledge. It must comply with 
the norms obtaining to it. But absolute knowledge does not exist. Even as 
an ideal it is impossible. It would fail to do justice to reality.
(4) The metaphor of seeing tends to connect knowledge with thought 
and mind in particular. In this way thinking or knowing and being are 
easily set against each other. If mind and thought lose their exclusive 
place, then this opposition can no longer be maintained either. If there is a
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plurality of relations and aspects in which the act of knowing takes place, 
knowing itself must be situated in reality. Knowing forms part of these 
relations. All kinds of aspects are modes of being and modes of experienc­
ing. Knowledge opens up reality, not only in the sense that a world can 
be opened for those who enter it, but also within this world itself, just as 
a flower opens in the light of the sun. This is perhaps most obvious where 
knowledge is directly connected with action. For action changes some­
thing in the world, it opens or, as the case may be, closes. But the same ap­
plies to knowledge that is not directly incorporated in action. Clearly this 
knowledge is not extraneous to reality either. Knowledge itself has the 
nature of an answer and as such forms an intrinsic part of reality. In this 
way it serves to open or, as it may be, close. It only depends on whether 
the answering nature of what is known is in fact recognized.
To sum up in one sentence: the visual metaphor tends toward abso­
lute knowledge, because rationality is seen as the absolute norm, norm 
interpreted as idea, whereas the metaphor of hearing points to intrinsic 
normativity which makes knowledge possible and tests it, with great em­
phasis on diversity, openness, and relationality, without detracting from 
the normative validity.24
IV. The Human Nature o f Knowing
The modern turn to the subject has introduced a new element into the 
motif of rationality. Ancient philosophy sees rationality (intelligibility) 
mainly as a property of reality itself. In Plato the ideas are not primarily the 
ideas of thought. They exist independently, as a reality of their own. And 
as such they are known. Descartes's methodological doubt looks for the 
starting-point of knowledge in thought itself. The knowing subject now 
becomes the intersection for the relation between knowledge and reality. 
The rationality of reality is mainly a matter of rational thought itself. It is 
methodologically constructed rather than contemplatively discovered.
The new position of the subject is therefore ambiguous. On the one 
hand the rationally constructive method is the way in which objective 
knowledge can be obtained. This suggests that knowledge is not made 
impure by something of the subject, mixed with elements which do not 
belong in objective knowledge, like emotions or value judgements. Objec­
tive knowledge is only concerned with the 'facts.' On the other hand the 
rationally constructive method itself is clearly something of the subject. 
For it is the mind which reasons and uses its concepts with a view to real­
ity. Hence the recurrent question: what validity do these concepts have in 
relation to reality as such?
The traditional position on rationality incorporates the human subject 
in the order of reality. There is a tension between rationality and what fails 
to meet its criteria, but the human subject as such is not set off against real­
ity. On the contrary, human existence shares in the tension within reality. 
It self is partly rational, partly sensual and material. This dualism is also 
found in Cartesian thought, but there it is connected with another dual­
ism, that of inside and outside, of consciousness and reality. As conscious­
ness human subjectivity stands opposite reality and the question is how 
she can find her way back to it.
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The result of this new conception of the subject is that much more 
emphasis is put on human subjectivity, because it is both the starting- 
point of methodologically acquired knowledge and the origin of values 
and norms. On the other hand reality becomes less human, because only 
methodological, preferably mathematical-scientific, value-free knowledge 
is supposed to give a reliable representation of objectively given reality.
Section 2 of this contribution already showed how Descartes's position 
comes into conflict with the biblical belief in creation. I will now try to give 
a more philosophical elaboration of our place in reality. Some elements 
from the third section will return in more detail.
4.1 Knowledge within Qualitative Structures
There is a popular notion of knowledge which puts all emphasis on its 
projective character. Knowledge starts with a certain expectation, with an 
assumption or hypothesis. The next step is to wait and see whether this 
hypothesis is correct. Reality is the test which confirms or disproves the 
hypothesis. Knowledge acquisition is like a net that is cast out in the hope 
of catching something. If the expected catch is found in the net, we have 
knowledge.
The projective element is doubtless present in our knowledge. But the 
question is whether our knowledge starts with it. In the first place we 
can ask whether expectation is not preceded by something. Is the hypoth­
esis purely random or is it formulated on the basis of existing data? Isn't 
an expectation mostly based on certain experiences? If I expect someone 
to be nice, I have probably found her to be nice. A second point is more 
fundamental. A design cannot lead to knowledge if there is not already a 
connection between the design and what it relates to. A fishing net cannot 
catch words or drops of rain. Net and fish share certain physical-spatial 
properties, so that the meshes in the net can be geared to the size of the 
fish. Only in this way is it possible to catch fish with such a net.
Knowledge as projection is only possible when there is a connection 
between the knowing subject and the known object. The suggestion of 
the notion of knowledge as projection is that knowledge starts as some­
thing in consciousness, is then tested against reality, and is confirmed or 
disproved in this way. This is a natural sequel to the Cartesian scheme: 
consciousness as starting-point opposite reality. But to take knowledge in 
this way is to put it in an impossible position from the outset. Casting a 
net only makes sense if it is based on a given correlation. Seeing depends 
on visibility. Thinking depends on conceivability. Description in language 
depends on something being describable. If these 'passive' properties are 
not present in the object of knowledge, the active functions are nothing 
but an attempt to catch air or words with a fishing net. So knowledge 
presupposes all kinds of coherences.
The various irreducible aspects or modes of being distinguished in Ref- 
ormational philosophy can be seen as so many relations of coherence. In 
principle, according to this theory, all phenomena in reality function in all 
aspects, either 'active' as subject or 'passive' as object. Let me explain this 
unusual terminology by giving an example.25 A tree has subject functions 
or 'active' properties in e.g., the spatial, the physical, and the biotic aspect 
and object functions or 'passive' properties in the psychic, the logical, the
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aesthetic, the legal aspect etc. That is to say, a tree itself does not feel and 
think, it does not have any experience of beauty and justice. But it can 
be felt and logically distinguished. It can also be an object of aesthetic 
emotion or of a conflict that is fought out in court. These object functions 
are only actualized in relation to subject functions or 'active' properties in 
the relevant aspects. The first example involves animals or human beings. 
The three others only involve human beings. But this does not mean that 
these objective properties are projected onto things. All the cases revolve 
around the tree itself. Hence the subject-object relations within an aspect 
are relations of coherence, like subject-subject relations.
As relations of coherence subject-subject relations and subject-object 
relations are presupposed in all knowledge. The human subject does not 
primarily function opposite reality, but within it, and as such is connected 
with it by a plurality of aspects. Knowledge therefore does not start with a 
projection, but starts from a primary connection. In knowledge this gradu­
ally unfolds as acquaintance. Subject-object relations need to be opened 
up. This happens when sensory perception develops, when thinking and 
speaking are learnt. In short, when reality opens up in experience, in the 
development of one human being and in the history of culture.
Unlike the subject-object scheme of Cartesian thought, therefore, this 
approach does not primarily place the knowing subject opposite reality, 
but incorporates it in reality. Knowing itself, too, takes place within reality 
and is not a connection which must bridge the gap between consciousness 
and reality. Other differences link up with this. In an alliance with math­
ematical-scientific thought, the Cartesian scheme tended towards a view 
in which objective reality has no other quality than quantitative determi- 
nacy. Objective, measurable facts opposite subjective values and norms. If 
a plurality of qualitatively different aspects as correlations can be found 
in reality, it is clear that in this respect, too, the Cartesian approach to 
reality cannot be maintained. Reality itself is characterized by qualitative 
diversity. Knowledge which fails to take this into account is valid at the 
very most only if its one-sided character is taken into consideration. The 
certainty achieved in this way means that justice cannot be done to the 
integral character of reality in a qualitative sense.
The qualitative aspect of reality immediately implies the normative 
aspect. This is best illustrated by examples. Someone who enters a room 
where a court session is being held will not understand what is happening 
if he has no notion of what jurisdiction involves. The qualitatively distinc­
tive nature of justice versus beauty, but also versus political power and 
economic benefit must be appreciated if someone is to understand what 
the judge is doing. The interest of justice may be at odds with the political 
advantage or economic benefit of those involved. The judge may include 
these aspects of the case in his considerations, but as such they should not 
be the deciding factor. The judgement must meet the criteria of the law, 
even if this involves political or economic disadvantage for parties. The 
quality of the law depends on the application of the law in a normative 
sense. This is true in every field.
Another example. Someone who sees marriage as socially recognized 
cohabitation in a sexual relationship with certain rights and duties laid 
down in law has cut off access to an understanding of the qualitatively
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distinctive nature of marriage. Though the normative dimension of mar­
riage is not absent in this formulation, it is interpreted in legal terms. And 
this does not tell us what is distinctive about marriage. For the promise 
that is made in front of the registrar is not primarily entrance into a legal 
contract, but the public confirmation of a mutual promise of faithfulness 
in a relationship of which the inner quality is determined by the degree to 
which mutual love is present. Someone who enters into a marriage takes 
on a normative task. And the quality experienced in marriage depends at 
the least to some extent on the degree to which this is taken seriously. The 
quality of life is closely bound up with the application of the norms ob­
taining to it. In fact this formulation is not yet adequate. The norms are not 
added from outside, they form an intrinsic part of life. They themselves 
constitute the quality. Hence they can never be totally ignored.
In contrast to what the Cartesian scheme suggests, the qualitative di­
versity with implied normativity therefore functions intrinsically in reality 
itself. Related to this is the fact that knowing forms an intrinsic part of real­
ity. The qualitative diversity is experienced as such. Or also: known. This 
is borne out by language. Our speech expresses the entire diversity within 
reality. And thus we encounter normativity again. For the way we speak 
can open up and close off reality. Someone who talks about sexuality pri­
marily in words deriving from obscene language will have great trouble 
with its significance in the context of a marital relationship. The view of the 
intimate encounter between two people can be blocked by a wrong use of 
language. Our being is codetermined by our knowing. And conversely, the 
way we exist helps to give direction to the development of our knowledge. 
And all aspects of reality function in this. In this way human knowledge 
forms part of reality itself, because human functioning with the typical hu­
man aspects forms an intrinsic part of reality in its integral existence.
4.2 Knowledge as Human Responsibility
There is another tension in Descartes's argumentation in which he tries 
to indicate the foundation for certain knowledge. At first he has enough 
in the starting-point 'I think, therefore I am' and the criterion which goes 
with it: every step in the methodological argument must have the same 
immediate obviousness as the starting-point found. But further on his ac­
count identifies another foundation: God. If human knowledge seems to 
have an absolute character on the basis of starting-point and method, the 
very fact of doubt itself makes it clear to Descartes that human knowledge 
is not perfect. This is also shown by the fact that the idea of God which we 
have cannot be explained on the basis of humankind itself. That is why 
God himself must exist. Next, all knowledge is found to be dependent on 
God for its reliability.
For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say, 
that all the things that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive 
of are true, is certain only because God is or exists, and that He is a 
Perfect Being, and that all that is in us issues from him. From this it 
follows that our ideas or notions, which to the extent of their being 
clear or distinct are ideas of real things issuing from God, cannot but 
to that extent be true.26
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If it seems at first that knowledge can be entirely founded in its certainty 
on the fact of consciousness and strict method, later everything is sus­
tained by Descartes's faith in God. Ultimately the certainty of method 
depends on religious trust. The influence of the Christian tradition is un­
doubtedly felt here. And because for Descartes truth depends on God, it 
will ultimately mean more to him than methodological certainty, which is 
significant only because it can be practically used.
In the course of the Modern Age this perspective changes. Knowledge 
must be able to stand on its own two feet, separate from any external foun­
dation, and certainly independent of any faith. Certainty becomes exclu­
sively a matter of subject and method. And the significance of knowledge 
is mainly seen to lie in its use. If this use cannot do justice to the signifi­
cance, because knowledge also has value as such, the meaning must still 
be thought as having its origin in the human subject.
It has become increasingly clear that thought on knowledge has thus 
set itself too difficult a task. Absolute certainty has not only proved unat­
tainable in practice, even in science, the ideal itself has also come under 
criticism, because it does not agree with the human character of knowl­
edge. Modern philosophy of science has come up against the same limits 
indicated in this essay from the perspective of creation belief. A similar 
problem occurs when we try to think the meaning of knowledge as consti­
tuted in the knowing subject. The problems caused by the subordination 
of all reality to human purposes have become evident in the negative con­
sequences entailed in technological control over both nature and society. 
If knowledge is not viewed as the means to an end, but as meaningful in 
itself, it is not easy to see how human subjectivity could be its origin. The 
problem is shown for instance by the fact that in philosophy it is usu­
ally not concrete people which are seen as the subject constituting this 
meaning. Especially in philosophy it is rather an abstract idea, which is 
then called a transcendental subject. More accurately, it is an absolutized 
function of concrete human beings, for instance their thought or their con­
sciousness. It could also be language.
The absolutization of a certain function as a designation of human sub­
jectivity continues a tendency already present in Descartes. After he has 
found his indisputable starting-point in 'I think, therefore I am,' he soon 
draws the conclusion: 'I am thinking.' This shows that the first proposi­
tion, which seems at first sight unproblematic, is open to criticism on 
further consideration, because the 'I' is introduced as a matter of course. 
When, next, in the second proposition, this 'I' is identified with one of its 
functions, namely the function in the first proposition, this self-evidence 
proves deceptive. It seems as if the subject of thought, and so of knowl­
edge, is thought itself, as the title of an article by Karl Popper strikingly 
puts it: 'Epistemology without a knowing subject.'27 As a result, the true 
subject, we in our concrete existence, disappears from view.
It is this approach which puts all emphasis on the certainty of knowl­
edge. Insofar as the matter of human responsibility is raised in connection 
with knowledge itself and not only with its application, it remains con­
fined to this. But this fails to address the question whether knowledge also 
does justice to reality's distinctive nature. Our integral responsibility for 
the qualitative opening up of reality in a normative sense cannot develop
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in this way. The presumption of an absolute position obscures the view 
of the real position. The human subject is not constitutive of knowledge 
in the sense of providing meaning, but in the sense of being responsible, 
of responding to the norms which determine the specifically structured 
cognitive situation.
It is clear from the above how much the view of knowledge held by 
people implies a view of themselves. As a natural sequel to the Cartesian 
method, humans are understood either from one or more of their func- 
tions—this is the sense in which we interpreted Descartes's statements 
above—or as the elusive subject which precedes them all: all functions can 
be objectified and analyzed, but the subject which carries out these acts re­
mains invisible for that very reason, just as the eye that sees objects cannot 
see itself at the same time. In both cases it is difficult to call humankind to 
account. If the person is approached from the viewpoint of some or other 
function, the nature of this function will be seen to determine her knowl­
edge. In that case it is the actual structures which determine the nature 
and scope of knowledge. These can be analyzed, but are not connected 
with responsibility. If the person is seen as a transcendental subject, which 
needs to be assumed in order to understand knowledge, any talk about 
responsibility is inappropriate too.
The perspective becomes very different when we reorientate ourselves 
to the biblical belief in creation. The human self as subject can then no lon­
ger be seen as withdrawn from structures nor as coinciding with them. She 
exists in these structures. Or rather, the structures enable her to exist. If we 
interpret existence once more as response, structures can be described as 
response structures. Typical human structures like thought, language, law 
etc. are response structures in a double sense. As creatures we respond to 
the promise-command to be on the basis of the structures by which we 
exist. As human beings we can be said to answer in responsibility for the 
structures in which we exist give us this possibility of responsibility.
But precisely when we speak about response and responsibility, it be­
comes clear that we as human beings are not absorbed in the structures. 
We are addressed as this unique human being. As such we must respond, 
also when we do this communally with others. The biblical belief in cre­
ation means we as human beings are addressed by God, uniquely and 
together with others. This should determine our self-understanding. On 
this basis the structures of our existence receive their deep meaning as re­
sponse structures. The creational relationship contains the ultimate foun­
dation of our responsibility. Our knowledge of reality forms the horizon 
within which we bear responsibility. But because in acquiring knowledge, 
too, we make choices and choose directions, knowledge itself is part of 
our responsibility. Its basic structures are given with the creation itself. 
From the creation they derive their qualitative nature and their normative 
determination. But how we exist in these structures and unfold them is 
our responsibility. That is why, in our knowing, we can open up and close 
off reality.
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